Reviews of the Book

Here's what reviewers of our book are saying...

"Nobody interested in the 1942-45 War in the Pacific should neglect Leon Cooper's book, which asks vital questions about the destructive, unended rivalry between the commands of General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, about lessons not learned from slaughter at Tarawa and Peleliu, about the failure of knowledge from the Manhattan Project to alter island-hopping after the Marianas Islands, and about dependence on the unreliable B-29s that could have spared one or more from the trio of Marianas, Iwo Jima and Okinawa."
----- Carl Woodring, former Chairman, Department of English, Columbia University and US Naval officer veteran of the Pacific War


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"Leon Cooper's first battle did not earn the name of "Bloody Tarawa" because things went well. He will tell you as he told me that the enemy was brave--if brutal--and that the plans laid by his own commanders didn't work out as written. It is a testament to the assault boat commanders' tenacity, basic skills and ability to improvise that helped US Marines to victory in a battle that would cause mothers of the fallen to call for the firing of Admiral Nimitz, the man they held responsible for killing their sons at Tarawa.

"Yet Bloody Tarawa had only happened in November of 1943. Victory in the Pacific would be years in coming. In the meantime, many other well-defended islands would have to be assaulted at the cost of many lives before the final bomber offensive against Japan could be unleashed to end the war.

"Leon Cooper now asks: Was there another way? Read his intriguing and informed impressions of the Pacific War and reach your own conclusions."
---- Michael Puttre, former Editor-in-Chief, "JED, The Journal of Electronic Defense." Producer of award-winning documentary, "Nagasaki."



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  "I've re-read 'War Plan Orange, Tarawa-The Crucible' and find your narrative very stimulating and thought-provoking. The retrospective view of Pacific battles reveals cases where bypass would have been a better choice than attack. We learned the hard way."
  ----- Donald Allen, author, "Tarawa-The Aftermath."

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Writer's Digest-15th Annual International Self-Published Awards has this to say:

"The War in the Pacific" is a refreshing look at a well-worn subject. Cooper takes on the Pacific theatre in critical fashion and quickly dispels the commonly accepted history of the war in the Pacific. His revelations about MacArthur's war plan, in particular, will surprise many readers. The writing is strong and easy to follow. The text is is well organized, with a table of contents, a bibliography and three appendices with high utility. The chapters are amply footnoted and punctuated with photos, maps, and infographics to illustrate the information. This book would be a great addition to the reading list of anyone interested in the war. Overall, a competent entry."

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"One third of the 300,000 American military casualties suffered in the Pacific Theatre of World War II were inflicted in just five of the many battles fought against the Japanese over the course of four years. "The War In The Pacific: A Retrospective", author Leon Cooper deftly analyzes these five particular battles waged during this hemispheric war drawing quite specifically upon his own experiences as a direct participant in these battles to seize and control Japanese-held islands. Cooper presents his own conclusions on whether the American military command under General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz evidenced good judgment in their decisions as to which islands to invade as the war progressed. Or if these commanders, most especially MacArthur, put self-aggrandizement and private agendas above the safety and best interest of the men they commanded. Cooper makes a persuasive case worthy of serious consideration that several of the major battles fought out at great cost to American forces had virtually nothing to do with defeating Japan and therefore represent an unnecessary sacrifice of American lives. As with the growing number of personal memoirs and biographies being contributed to a growing library of first hand reports from frontline participants who fought in World War II, "The War In The Pacific" is a welcome and invaluable contribution to American Military History in general, and the Pacific Theatre campaigns in particular.

-- Midwest Book Review (Oregon, USA)

We received the following email on July 30, 2007:

Dear Leon,

I was reading your retrospective of WW2 and it sure has me thinking. I think you are on to something ie why the hell couldn't we wait before doing Okinawa when we were almost ready with the 'bomb.' Makes a lot of sense.

I also have now started to look much differently at Nimitz, although you and I probably both agree that Dugout Doug should have been court-martialed for leaving those planes where they were on Clark Field so that they would be perfect targets for the Nips. So, what did we do? Gave him the Congressional Medal of Honor. I wish there was a movement to take it away from that pompous ass.

And I am now changing the way I look at Peleliu and Iwo Jima, too.

Plus, I didn't know that all those plans were pre-Pearl Harbor and you are right. In fact, all of those plans should have been burned right after Pearl or at least after Midway, when we should have realized that it was all changed. Hell, we knew before Pearl that it wasn't a battleship Navy, when Halsey went delivering planes and left the battleships in port. They were the past then and we knew it. To me, though, we did what we did and here's why: a military aide kept going into Lyndon Johnson's office, telling him, time after time, that we should end the war. Finally, Lyndon put his head in his hands and told the aide why he couldn't stop the war, because, "Too many of my friends are making money."

And, here in 2007, it is probably the same reason.

Peace,

Jeffrey McMeans

Really enjoyed it and your other book, too.

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LEON COOPER AND THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC

There used to be a radio program that dramatized significant events in history. The program, hosted by Walter Cronkite, was named, “You Are There”; it eventually moved to TV. At the end of each program, Cronkite would declare with echo-chamber effect, “Everything is as it was, except YOU WERE THERE!” Leon Cooper, our speaker on 5 September, dramatized for us the war in the Pacific, and he WAS there; a lesson in history is always more powerful and memorable when related by an actual eyewitness; no echo-chamber is needed.

What Leon Cooper witnessed, as a Navy officer in charge of a Higgins Boat that took invading Marines ashore, was the wholesale carnage of his passengers caused by poorly planned and executed direct frontal assaults on well-defended beaches.

A lesson in history is not only more powerful and memorable when related by an actual eyewitness, it is made more so when that eyewitness has had time to maturely reflect on the meanings and causes of those events. These mature reflections are the major thrust of this, his second book about his wartime experiences. (His first book, “90 Day Wonder”, was the subject of a previous Ridge Writers program.)

Here are the major points made by the book and conveyed by the speaker:

·        The Navy’s Island-Hopping strategy was outmoded (i.e., based on past wars), delayed the end of the war and resulted in needless casualties;

·        Whereas the war in Europe was under the single command of Eisenhower, the Pacific conflict suffered from a divided and often confused command – Gen. Douglas MacArthur vs. Adm. Chester Nimitz;

·        The kowtowing to the egomaniacal MacArthur, especially as regards the unnecessary retaking of the Phillipines, was probably based on Roosevelt’s desire to keep MacArthur from running against him in the 1944 presidential election;

·        The B-29 (“The World’s Lousiest Airplane”) was rushed into production without adequate testing. It was powered by Wright (wrong!) engines that frequently caught fire. The Army Air Corps had to set up centers to rebuild these planes, correcting many design defects. Sen. Harry Truman’s investigation characterized the B-29 program as quantity trumping quality.

Although these corrections to the common, cleansed version of history are refreshing to those of us who lived thru that era, Cooper expressed doubt as to whether the military and its civilian superiors have learned anything from history. Pity!

Steve Wersan